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Introduction
Land is of fundamental importance for agricultural pro-
duction. Its relevance from an analytical point of view stems 
from its characteristic immobility and from the fact that it 
is not producible. Its local availability is naturally restricted 
and in terms of land endowment the decline of one local pro-
ducer is a necessary prerequisite for the growth of another. 
Accordingly, on the local land market1 there is direct inter-
action among a restricted number of producers. This situa-
tion opens up the possibility that not only farmers’ strategies 
affect the local land market but that the local land market 
conversely affects farmers’ strategies. Most studies on struc-
tural change in agriculture consider the former, but not the 
latter.
Fundamental differences in farm development strategies 
are frequently reported (Margarian, 2010a). For Germany, 
these strategies are described mainly in sociological stud-
ies (e.g. Patrick et al., 1983; Hildenbrand et al., 1992; Her-
rmann, 1993; Sinkwitz, 2001). The observed differences 
are often explained by assumed exogenous differences in 
attitudes, which can be subsumed under the labels ‘con-
servative’ vs. ‘growth-oriented’. Jürgens (2010) critically 
considers this strict dichotomy and its genesis. Van der 
Ploeg (1994) introduced the more differentiated concept of 
‘styles of farming’. This concept acknowledges the exist-
ence of a large number of rationalities, which are assumed 
to refl ect the specifi c surrounding conditions and own capa-
bilities of farmers. This insight paves the way for the idea 
of a refl exive relationship between environment and behav-
iour. The hypothesis of such a refl exive relationship would 
be supported if signifi cant differences in strategies could be 
observed, not only between farms but at a regional level as 
well.
Spatially differing dynamics of farm structure develop-
ments (Huettel and Margarian, 2009) as well as anecdotal 
evidence2 and sporadic scientifi c observations (e.g. Ohe, 
1985; Weiss, 1999; Goetz and Debertin, 2001; Tietje, 2004; 
1  We refer to rental markets. Sale markets are much more infl uenced by strategic 
long term considerations and by activities of non-local investors.
2  See e.g. dlz agrarmagazin 2/2007, p.147; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
126/2007, p.15 and Süddeutsche Zeitung 135/2006, p.V2/4.
Roeder et al., 2006) hint at regional differences / spatial 
covariances in farmers’ strategies. Corresponding to the 
identifi ed differences in attitudes, these covariances are 
sometimes explained by exogenous regional differences in 
cultural backgrounds (e.g. Roeder et al., 2006). Attempts to 
explain these behavioural covariances with ‘hard’ exogenous 
factors, especially regional labour market situations, have 
produced ambiguous results (e.g. Weiss, 1999; Goetz und 
Debertin, 2001; Glauben et al., 2006; Breustedt and Glau-
ben, 2007).
The specifi c characteristics of the land market have so 
far seldom been applied in order to explain regional vari-
ances in farm development strategies. The present paper tries 
to empirically document the proposed refl exive relationship 
between the land market and farmers’ strategies. It thereby 
questions the approach of taking different strategies as given 
in economic models and attributing them solely to exoge-
nously given differences in fundamental conditions and pref-
erences. The answer to the question whether strategies are 
endogenously or exogenously determined is of fundamental 
importance for explaining structural change.
The following section outlines why the land market’s 
characteristics cause a direct interconnectedness among 
farmers’ decisions on growth, regional covariances in their 
strategies and thereby path dependence. The relationship 
between farmers’ strategies and the land market is tested 
empirically based on data from a standardised regionalised 
survey among farm advisors and on additional data from sec-
ondary statistics. Firstly, the impact of the land market and of 
the initial farm size distribution on farmers’ observed strate-
gies is analysed in a regression approach. Then the reversed 
impact of the observed strategies, as mitigated by observed 
attitudes, upon the contemporaneous situation on the land 
market is analysed. Finally the implications of these fi ndings 
are discussed.
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An economic rationale for a refl exive 
relationship between markets and 
strategies
If markets were perfect in the neoclassical sense, prices 
would transport all information necessary in order to develop 
perfect strategies and the unrestricted mobility of factors 
would allow all factors to be transferred immediately to those 
places were they generate the highest possible private and 
social value. Global price signals would direct the develop-
ment towards global equilibria. In the presence of non-mar-
ketable values such as rents of the status quo, global prices 
no longer effectively coordinate the decisions of economic 
actors and local price information (Makowski and Ostroy, 
1995) and local interaction among actors becomes relevant. 
In the consequence, “economic actors are connected not 
by several main highways, but by a myriad of individual 
byways of their own construction” (ibid. p.811), i.e. different 
strategies evolve endogenously and the relationship between 
strategies and markets becomes refl exive.
As land is immobile and its availability delimited, the 
number of potential market participants in the local rental 
market for land is restricted. Moreover, the growth of one 
farm in terms of land depends on the decline of another. The 
decisions on growth or decline thereby depend heavily on 
the anticipated strategies of local competitors (Margarian, 
2010a, b). This direct interaction in an oligopolistic market 
enables strategic behaviour, i.e. market participants antici-
pate expected decisions of others in their own course of deci-
sion making (Woeckener, 2007). In this case, refl exivity in 
markets arises as market structures determine decisions on 
market entry and market exit as well as decisions on growth.
Additionally, sunk costs, specifi c competences of farm-
ers, non-pecuniary preferences for farming and other pos-
sible causes of rents of the status quo cause heterogeneous 
valuation of additional units of land by different producers. 
Under these conditions, supply of land does not react totally 
elastically towards higher prices. The most effi cient farm-
ers cannot simply overbid (technically) less effi cient farmers 
(competition on prices or ‘Bertrand competition’, Woeck-
ener, 2007) but need to take into account higher prices of 
each additional unit of demand (Margarian, 2010a, b). As is 
well known from the monopolistic case, the farmer in this 
situation takes into account rising prices and adjusts his/her 
demand downward. Those farmers that want to stabilise their 
farm in order to support the future realisation of rents of the 
status quo, might then have the opportunity to afford the nec-
essary growth, although at a relatively high price. In the case 
of symmetric growth, the situation mirrors what has come to 
be known as quantity competition or the ‘Cournot’ case (e.g. 
Varian, 1992; Woeckener, 2007).
Nevertheless, incomplete information and rents of the 
status quo enable some market participants to manipulate 
expectations concerning their own current and future market 
position and to thereby induce asymmetric growth. Espe-
cially sunk investments allow some actors to believably 
signal their strong will for future growth; at the same time, 
others anticipate the resulting stronger limitation of market 
access and restrict their own supply, respectively demand. In 
the oligopolistic setting this differentiation in quantity lead-
ers and quantity followers is called, after its inventor, the 
‘Stackelberg’ case (e.g. Varian, 1992; Woeckener, 2007).
Consequently, the actual differentiation of strategies 
and the resulting development in the farm size distribution 
depend on the heterogeneous ability of producers to believ-
ably signal their future demand for land. Farmers have the 
ability to signal believably a strong will for growth in land 
to competitors if they invest in large facilities, because the 
profi tability of a specifi c type of production at a given scale 
in family farms with their quasi-fi xed labour pool depends 
on the farm’s endowment with land. Regional differences in 
farmers’ strategies could then be explained in terms of the 
share of farmers that act as quantity followers or as quantity 
leaders analogously to the Stackelberg case.
These shares are expected to depend on the initial farm 
size distribution. If farm land historically was distributed 
unevenly among farms, large farms would initially act as 
natural quantity leaders due to their larger capacities and 
fi nancial power, while small farms would be natural quantity 
followers that anticipate their restricted access to addition-
ally available land. If no quantity leaders existed, the local 
situation would mirror the oligopolistic situation in symmet-
ric quantity competition in the Cournot case. In this case, all 
farms would act as quantity adopters, but their potential for 
growth would be higher and costs of growth lower than that 
of the quantity followers in the Stackelberg case. Thereby, 
a sustainable impact of the initial farm land distribution on 
local farmers’ strategies could be explained. An additional 
unknown factor is the direction and size of scale effects. 
Actually, it has been shown theoretically and empirically 
that structural development in agriculture might be largely 
determined by the initial structural situation due to existing 
rents of the status quo and strategic interaction on the land 
market (Huettel and Margarian, 2009; Margarian, 2010a).
According to the argument, observed strategies are 
expected to represent rational adaptations to given condi-
tions. Strategies that express themselves in a slow expansion 
in land result from a tight land market and the existence of 
high rents of the status quo, due to low opportunity costs 
of labour, for example. Producers that follow these strate-
gies might be judged as ‘conservative’ by observers, while 
their behaviour might be perfectly rational given the farm’s 
situation and the situation of surrounding farms. ‘Growth 
oriented’ producers, on the contrary, leave an entrepreneur-
ial impression on observers. Nevertheless, unconditional 
growth orientation could be highly irrational if the land 
market is tight and neighbouring farms show similar ambi-
tions. Beyond these rough classifi cations into conservative 
and growth oriented farmers, depending on specifi c and 
sometimes idiosyncratic circumstances, countless individual 
strategies of adaptation evolve. This multifariousness, in 
accordance with Makowski and Ostroy (1995), is a direct 
consequence of imperfect markets, resulting uncertainty and 
direct interaction among market participants.
Based on these considerations, some simple hypotheses 
are derived for the following analysis: (a) with a historically 
uneven distribution of land among farms, the majority of 
local farms act as quantity followers and is thereby perceived 
as conservative; (b) farmers are assessed as more conserva-
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tive if rents of the status quo are high and exit mobility is 
consequently low; and (c) as fundamental market condi-
tions affect producers’ ability to stabilise their farms, they 
also affect the attitudes of surviving producers, which in turn 
affect the local land market.
Two rationales form the basis for the third hypothesis: 
Firstly, competition induces a process of selection. If com-
petition is fi erce, only the most growth oriented farms sur-
vive. If competition is less intense, the variance in attitudes 
of surviving farms naturally increases. Secondly, human 
culture adapts to given economic and structural conditions. 
Specifi c values are ascribed to given occupations and struc-
tures, which are charged with additional meaning depend-
ing on further social and economic conditions. Thereby, the 
observed fundamental strategies might be accompanied by 
different additional values and attitudes. These would in 
turn impact upon the local land market, leaving a role, albeit 
reduced, for exogenous cultural differences in the explana-
tion of structural development. Nevertheless, the extent of 
this role again depends on the type of local competition.
Empirical analysis of farmers’ 
strategies
The derived hypotheses shall be tested with data from 
a standardised survey among farm advisors that was con-
ducted in 2007. Agricultural advisors usually work within a 
restricted area. Here they are natural experts on the farmers’ 
restrictions and opportunities, their strategies and processes 
of decision making. Two hundred and twenty-one advisors 
took part in an email survey that consisted of about 120 
statements that were to be evaluated on a scale from 1 (cor-
responding to ‘in (nearly) no case’) to 7 (‘in (nearly) every 
case’). The experts were asked to concentrate on the situa-
tion in a NUTS 3 level district (Landkreis) of high familiar-
ity. Their assessments concerned 145 different districts from 
across western Germany.
A validation of the assessments was possible due to 
the multiple references of different experts to 61 of these 
districts. With a variance analysis3, the signifi cance of the 
variation of the advisors’ assessments between districts as 
compared to the variance of the assessments between advi-
sors was determined. After dropping assessments for the 
same districts that deviated from each other by more than 
two points, the signifi cance of differences in the assessments 
between districts was guaranteed for nearly all statements. In 
this manner, about 13 per cent of all statements were judged 
as deviating values and replaced by missing values. The same 
rate of misjudgement is expected for districts covered by 
only one expert. From the remaining values, the mean value 
was calculated for each district in order to reach a univo-
cal assessment on the district’s farming sector. The resulting 
data set consists of one set of assessed statements for each of 
the 145 districts. Based on these data, we create factors that 
capture farmers’ situations and strategies, explain farmers’ 
observed strategies with regional indicators related to initial 
3 This and all other statistical calculations were conducted in the statistical pro-
gramme package SAS 9.2.
farm structure and economic opportunities and fi nally ana-
lyse the relationship between the strategies and the current 
situation on the land market.
Creation of factors
In the survey, two dimensions served the rough classi-
fi cation of farmers from the observers’ point of view. One 
dimension was traditional or conservative behaviour (‘con-
servative’), which was ascribed towards farmers whose main 
aim consists of stabilising their farm, who therefore avoid 
risk and make small steps of growth (Figure 1). Observers 
perceive such a strategy as traditional, but it would also be 
consistent with the strategy of quantity followers in strategic 
competition on the land market. Of the 221 respondents, fi ve 
did not assess the corresponding statement. In more than half 
of the assessments, farmers in the respective districts were 
classifi ed as rather conservative (fi ve or more points on the 
scale), in less than a quarter as rather not conservative (three 
or less points on the scale). The remaining assessments 
were intermediate (four points on the scale). Even before 
removing 17 deviating assessments, the differences in the 
assessment of conservative behaviour of farmers between 
the districts according to the variance analysis were highly 
signifi cant. Obviously, the dimension of conservative behav-
iour corresponded to an existing common mental construct 
among farm advisors.
The second dimension for a rough classifi cation of farm-
ers according to their strategic behaviour was an entrepre-
neurial attitude, which was ascribed to farmers who invest 
capital and labour where they are most profi table (‘entre-
preneur’, Figure 2). Four assessments were missing for the 
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Figure 1: Assessment by farm advisors of farmers’ conservatism in 
NUTS 3 districts of western Germany in 2007.
CONSERVATIVE: ‘Farmers here are rather conservative/traditional: Their main goal 
is their farm‘s stability. They avoid risk and make small steps of growth in existing 
branches’.
Missing values: 5; deleted ‘outliers’: 17; share of variance that can be attributed to 
differences between districts in raw data: 56%, Pr > F 0.0008; between Mean Square 
2.5; within Mean Square 1.23
Source: own data
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corresponding statement. The distribution of assessments 
revealed that this dimension clearly measured something 
different from the fi rst dimension. The variance of assess-
ments in this case was rather low, with 40 per cent of all 
assessments concentrated at fi ve points on the scale. Differ-
ences between districts in entrepreneurial attitude were not 
signifi cant before removing 24 deviating values.
While the fi rst dimension determined the farmers’ atti-
tude with respect to their farm, this second dimension is 
concerned with general behaviour. Clearly, a high ranking of 
general conservative behaviour is rather rare; underlining the 
assumption that observed conservative behaviour of farmers 
is due to special conditions and restrictions of agriculture. 
Only if conservatism has a high and entrepreneurial attitude 
a low assessment are the farmers in a district assessed as 
conservative in every respect. If both received high points on 
the scale, the respective farmers are conservative in agricul-
ture but otherwise entrepreneurial. The case of low values in 
both dimensions did not occur (Figure 3a). Finally, if the fi rst 
dimension received low values while the second was ranked 
highly, farmers’ entrepreneurial behaviour generally domi-
nates. By subtracting values of ‘conservative’ from values of 
‘entrepreneur’, a single factor (MODERN) was created that 
captured all of these nuances. Owing to the fact that the case 
of low values in both dimensions did not occur, the middle 
values of MODERN are non-ambiguous in their interpreta-
tion. Therefore, MODERN shows a strong negative correla-
tion with assessments on conservative attitudes (‘tradition’) 
(Figure 3b) and a strong positive correlation with entrepre-
neurial attitudes (Figure 3c). It was therefore possible to 
replace two seemingly loosely related dimensions (Figure 
3a) by a single factor. Moreover, this new indicator could 
remove possible biases in the assessments due to different 
interpretations of the scale of different experts.
While the factor MODERN for the assessment of farm-
ers’ general attitude was constructed by simply differencing 
the assessments concerning two separate dimensions from 
the survey, other factors characterising specifi c restrictions, 
opportunities and strategies of farmers were created by 
factor-analysis. Therefore, in a fi rst step those statements of 
the survey were selected that were assumed to relate to a 
common underlying concept. The concepts relevant for the 
following analysis are ‘Behaviour’, ‘Dynamics’ and ‘Oppor-
tunities’. With the assessed statements of each conceptual 
group, one factor-analysis has been conducted separately. 
Usually four to fi ve factors were identifi ed that describe dif-
ferent dimensions of each concept (Table 1).
The creation of factors serves the aim of condensing a 
multiplicity of variables with similar implications in order 
to avoid, for example, problems of multicollinearity in sub-
sequent analyses. Here, it also served the aim to raise the 
validity of the experts’ subjective assessments by compen-
sating erroneous assessments of single statements with other 
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Figure 3: Scatter-plots of conservative and entrepreneurial behaviour of farmers in NUTS 3 districts of western Germany in 2007 and of 
the factor MODERN.
Number of observations: 137, 95% in ellipse
Source: own fi gure
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Figure 2: Assessment by farm advisors of farmers’ entrepreneurial 
behaviour in NUTS 3 districts of western Germany in 2007.
ENTREPRENEUR: ‘Farmers here are entrepreneurially oriented: They invest labour 
and capital where it is most profi table’.
Missing values: 4; deleted ‘outliers’: 24; Share of variance that can be attributed to 
differences between districts in raw data: 41%, non-signifi cant; between Mean Square 
1.67; within Mean Square 1.44
Source: own data
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assessments for additional statements. Moreover, in the fac-
tor analysis, continuous variables (factors) are created from 
the discrete assessment values of the original variables. 
Therefore, the subsequent linear regression is more appro-
priate if it is based on factors. Factor-analysis is based on the 
correlation between single variables. If correlations are low, 
subsuming the respective variables in common factors might 
not be adequate. Nevertheless, the ‘measure of adequacy’ 
(MSA) showed that the variables from the experts’ assess-
ments were suitable. Owing to the facts that unbalanced cor-
relation matrices were used because of many missing values 
and that the subjective assessments are expected to be erro-
neous, a common factor (CF) analysis was conducted rather 
than an analysis of principal components (PC) (Backhaus 
et al., 2003). In CF, the common variance of all variables 
is explained rather than total variance; therefore, expected 
communalities and eigenvalues are below one. The neces-
sary priors for expected communalities were estimated with 
the ‘squared multiple correlations’ (SMC) technique (Loe-
hlin, 2004). Table 1 presents the explained shares of com-
mon variance in total variance for each analysis; with about 
0.3 it is clearly below one for all three CFs as expected due to 
measurement errors and missing values. The judgement on 
the number of extracted factors relied on a balanced assess-
ment (a) of the factors’ absolute eigenvalues, which should 
equal at least one according to the Kaiser-criterion in PC but 
not necessarily in CF and (b) of a Scree-Test (Backhaus et 
al., 2003), which graphically compares each factor’s relative 
Table 1: Factors and their underlying statements that describe the observed behaviour of farmers, observed farm dynamic in the districts, 
and observed opportunities for farmers in NUTS 3 districts of western Germany in 2007.
Behaviour (total communality or common variance: 2.84; explained share in total variance 0.28) N Factor loading
Habitual behaviour [HABITUAL] (0.65)
“Underinvesting farmers lack faith and/or interest in their farm’s ability for sustainable development.” 138  0.69
“Such unprofi table farms are kept up because exiting farming seems unthinkable.” 137  0.50
“Underinvestment in farms is due to risk-aversion of farmers.” 138  0.47
Entrepreneurial behaviour [ENTREPRENEUR] (0.41)
“Farmers here are entrepreneurial: they invest labour and capital where it is most profi table.” 141  0.61
“Farmers here are rather conservative: they mainly want to stabilise their farms. They avoid risk and usually develop slowly in 
approved fi elds.” 140 -0.36
“The necessary employment of non-family labour is a hindrance because farmers here view it sceptically.” 131 -0.37
Commitment of farmers and their family [COMMITMENT] (0.41)
“Farms here support each other based on mutual trust (neighbourly help).” 135  0.45
“Farm families are willing to sacrifi ce profi t and consumption in the short term in order to sustain the farm in the long term.” 139  0.44
“Income from non-farm labour is also employed in order to stabilise the farm fi nancially.” 140  0.42
Esteem of farmers and farming [ESTEEM] (0.20)
“The exit from agriculture brings with it a loss of esteem for the farmer.” 134  0.46
Dynamics (total communality or common variance: 1.84; explained share in total variance 0.26)
Danger of rupture in structural change [RUPTURE] (1.21)
“Exiting farms are characterised by below-average endowment with land.” 141  0.58
“Middle size farms are left behind here. They need to exit or change into part-time farming in the medium term.” 138  0.55
“Exits from farming occur with the alternation of generations.” 141  0.48
“Growing farms are large farms.” 144  0.41
“Exiting farms are characterised by good non-farm income opportunities of the farmer, e.g. its successor.” 135  0.38
Stability of farms [STABILITY] (0.61)
“Farms with low growth potential are continued by farm successors.” 139  0.55
“Stable farms with growth potential are continued by farm successors.” 144  0.44
Opportunities (total communality or common variance: 3.84; explained share in total variance 0.35)
Lacking profi tability of agriculture [NOPROFIT] (1.67)
“In arable crops profi tability of necessary investment would be questionable without farm investment aid.” 124  0.78
“In pork and poultry profi tability of necessary investment would be questionable without farm investment aid.” 142  0.65
“In specialised cultivation profi tability of necessary investment would be questionable farm investment aid.” 142  0.58
“In dairy farming profi tability of necessary investment would be questionable without farm investment aid.” 139  0.51
Situation on local land market [LANDMARKET] (0.95)
“Demand for land is larger than supply.” 138  0.55
“Change to part-time farming is a reaction to lacking growth possibilities due to a tight land market.” 132  0.52
“The necessary employment of non-family labour is a hindrance because the necessary abrupt growth not possible.” 132  0.43
Investment opportunities [INVESTOPTION] (0.58)
“More investments in new farm activities would be reasonable.” 132  0.52
“Full-time farms have additional income sources to farming.” 136  0.39
Availability of additional income [ADINCOME] (0.57)
“Farmers that look for a non-farm job are usually successful.” 138  0.41
“Underinvestment of farmers is due to risk averse banks.” 135 -0.46
Note: Pairwise deletion of missing values: Minimum number of observations used for correlations is N = 113
The number in brackets after factors gives the common variance explained by each factor after oblique rotation
Source: based on data from responses to a farm-advisor survey conducted by the author in 2007
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contribution to the explanation of variance. Considerations 
concerning the factors’ content provided additional guid-
ance. Factors were rotated orthogonally and obliquely (ibid.) 
in order to reach unambiguously interpretable factors. Fac-
tors were interpreted considering all variables with a loading 
of 0.3 or higher.
Four of the factors in Table 1 describe the opportunities 
of farmers in the district: NOPROFIT describes defi cits in 
regional profi tability of agricultural production. INVESTOP-
TION describes alternative opportunities to invest in the 
region within or outside agriculture. ADINCOME describes 
the probability of an advantageous non-agricultural employ-
ment, which also reduces willingness to invest in agriculture 
even though accessibility to credit might be good. LAND-
MARKET describes the situation on the land market. It has 
high values if demand is high as compared to supply and if 
growth is restricted by scarcity in land.
Four factors were extracted that describe the observed 
behaviour of farmers: ESTEEM describes whether being a 
farmer is, in the farmers’ eyes, related to a positive social 
standing. COMMITMENT describes whether belonging to 
the farmers’ community is associated with special values. 
ENTREPRENEUR is very similar to MODERN, which was 
constructed by a naïve unweighted aggregation of the two 
original variables ‘conservative’ and ‘entrepreneurial’. The 
main difference between MODERN and ENTREPRENEUR 
is the discrete character of the fi rst and the continuous char-
acter of the latter variable. Finally, HABITUAL describes a 
situation where farms are kept up due to lacking alternatives 
rather than due to development potentials.
Four factors (NOPROFIT, LANDMARKET, 
INVESTOPTION and ADINCOME) relate to opportunities. 
Two factors deal with the observed farm dynamic in the dis-
tricts. RUPTURE describes a situation that signals retarded 
structural change with few viable farms and many non-via-
ble farms that are expected to leave the sector in the nearer 
future. High values of STABILITY in contrast signal that 
farms in the district are stable. The distributions of values 
of the ten factors are presented in box and whisker plots in 
Figure 4. Mean values are indicated by a cross and outliers 
are plotted as individual points.
Explanation of farmers’ observed strategies
A strategy that aims at farm stabilisation rather than at 
farm growth is defi ned as conservative. Often, conservative 
behaviour is judged as non-entrepreneurial. Nevertheless, 
the risk-avoiding stabilising behaviour of reduced growth 
might be a rational strategy of farm/fi rm development in the 
presence of rents of the status quo and quantity competi-
tion on the land market. Whether these conditions actually 
explain the perceived conservatism of farmers is analysed 
in a regression analysis. This analysis aims at a substantia-
tion of the idea of a refl exive relationship between farmers’ 
strategies and the land market.
As endogenous variables we use the original variable 
‘conservative’, which is based on a single statement, as 
well as the two factors MODERN and ENTREPRENEUR, 
which are constructed from two, respectively three state-
ments. With the estimation of these different models the 
robustness of results shall be demonstrated with respect to 
different specifi cations. The discrete variables MODERN 
and ‘conservative’ with 10, respectively 7 ordered levels are 
explained in multinomial logistic models with proportional 
odds. This model type implies that identical coeffi cients 
can be applied in order to explain the relative probabilities 
of all levels. A score test showed that the assumption on 
proportional odds for a multinomial model was not justi-
fi ed for MODERN and ‘conservative’ on the original scale. 
Therefore, the values of MODERN were aggregated into 
three (< 0, 0 - 1, > 1) and those of ‘conservative’ were aggre-
gated into four classes (<= 3, 4, 5, >= 6). For the three- and 
four-class models the assumption of proportional odds were 
not rejected. The factor ENTREPRENEUR is a continuous 
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variable and has as such been explained by a linear least 
square model.
Exogenous variables are presented in Table 24. The Gini 
coeffi cient in our case describes the distribution of land in 
hectares with respect to different farm size classes (Marga-
rian, 2010a). Principally, a higher value of the Gini coef-
fi cient indicates a higher inequality in the distribution. We 
introduce the Gini coeffi cient for land distribution in 1979 
into our model in order to refl ect the initial or historical situ-
ation. Earlier data were not available. The initial farm size 
distribution (GINI79) is expected to have a high impact on 
the growth history of farms in the districts due to its impact 
on strategy differentiation between quantity leaders and 
quantity followers. The growth history determines the strate-
gic regime or the growth orientation of farms in the district. 
Specifi cally, a high Gini coeffi cient, i.e. strong inequality in 
historical land distribution is assumed to cause a differen-
tiation into few farms with strong growth (quantity leaders 
on the land market) and many farms with restricted growth 
(quantity followers on the land market) if rents of the status 
quo are considerable. The value added of land (VALUEAD-
DED) contributes positively to possible rents of the status 
quo of agriculture. At the same time, it also makes a poten-
tially positive contribution to the possible rents of growth. 
Its expected impact is therefore ambiguous. The share of 
less favoured land (LESSFAVOURED) relates negatively 
to the potential rents of the status quo5. The share of rented 
land (RENTEDLAND) reduces possible rents of the status 
quo as it contributes to a potential instability of the status 
quo situation. Milk production (COWS) is characterised by 
a relatively low land-intensity of production. Additionally, 
high capital and labour intensity and specifi city contribute 
to higher rents of the status quo due to sunk costs in milk 
production. The mean size of farms in land (MEANSIZE) 
determines the present full-time farms’ necessity for growth 
and is therefore negatively related to the realisable rents of 
growth. A larger mean size should accordingly be related 
positively to conservatism. Nevertheless, as smaller farms 
result from restricted growth in the past, the factor could 
also support the confl icting hypothesis and has ambiguous 
implications.
The logistic model explains the probability that a dis-
4 Other covariates had originally been included. One example is the share of arable 
land. Nevertheless, those variables that did not add to the explanatory power of the mod-
els have been removed subsequently in order to fi ght the problem of multi-collinearity.
5 The same models have alternatively been estimated with a measure for the mean 
quality of arable land (the German EMZ value) in the district, which are expected to be 
positively related to rents of the status quo. Results were as expected inversely related 
to those with the share of less favoured land. It was not possible to include both indica-
tors in the model because of their strong multi-collinearity.
trict’s farmers are characterised by conservative behaviour 
according to external observers (low values of MODERN 
and high values in ‘conservative’). The least square model 
reversely explains the more entrepreneurial orientation of a 
district’s farmers. In the estimation, interactions among vari-
ables were controlled since these interactions allow for the 
test of conditional hypotheses (Brambor et al., 2006). They 
therefore allow us to test the interplay between rents of the 
status quo and initial farm size distribution and their com-
mon impact upon farmers’ strategic orientation. In order 
to make coeffi cients in the presence of interactions easily 
interpretable, variables have been centred on their mean 
(Jaccard, 2001)6. Some of the variables have been rescaled 
to create comparable values in order to facilitate conver-
gence. Considering the test statistics at the foot of Table 3, 
the models are highly signifi cant: The differences in experts’ 
assessments on farmers’ conservatism in different regions 
are explainable by the theoretically relevant variables from 
secondary statistics. The results are stable with respect to the 
different models estimated.
As expected, the historical distribution of land has a 
strong impact upon the observed behaviour of farmers, but 
this impact depends on additional conditions. Those vari-
ables that are assumed to capture existing rents of the status 
quo (LESSFAVOURED and RENTEDLAND) are insignifi -
cant themselves but have a highly signifi cant role in mod-
erating the effect of GINI79. Figure 5 illustrates the condi-
tional relationship between the Gini coeffi cient (unevenness 
in land distribution) in 1979 and the estimated values of the 
factor ENTREPRENEUR. The fi gure is based on the coef-
fi cients of the last model in Table 3. It shows that there is the 
expected negative relationship between observed entrepre-
neurial behaviour and historical unevenness in land distribu-
tion in regions with low relevance of less favoured land: In 
these regions with potentially high rents of the status quo, a 
higher Gini coeffi cient contributes to stronger conservatism 
in the observed behaviour. Here, the multitude of smaller 
farms reacts by reduced growth to the original unevenness in 
land distribution (quantity followers in Stackelberg competi-
tion) and simultaneously shows a reduced exit mobility. In 
regions with a high relevance of less favoured areas, in con-
trast, there is a positive relationship between the Gini coeffi -
cient and entrepreneurial orientation. In these regions where 
the expected rents of the status quo are lower, the original 
6 The assessment of the signifi cance of interaction terms is usually rather tedious in 
linear models as well as in logistic models (see for example Margarian, 2012). Never-
theless, the application of models with moderator variables and mediator variables has 
recently been largely facilitated by a newly developed macro (PROCESS) for SPSS 
and SAS (Hayes, 2013).
Table 2: NUTS 3 district level variables explaining the strategic behaviour of farmers in western Germany in 2007.
Name Meaning Possible range Mean Std. dev. Min Max
GINI79 Inequality in land distribution in 1979 0-1  0.41  0.05  0.33  0.59
LESSFAVOURED Share of less favoured land 0-1  0.50  0.38  0.00  1.00
LANDQUALITY Normed quality of land 0-100 47.47 10.46 28.62 75.44
MEANSIZE Mean farm size (hectares) > 0 30.32 12.35  9.46 70.11
COWS Dairy cows per 100 hectares >= 0 27.95 18.27  0.26 83.56
VALUEADDED Agric. value added per 10 hectares (EUR 1000) >= 0 15.79  8.16  4.63 47.62
RENTEDLAND Share of rented land cultivated by farmers 0-1  0.43  0.10  0.20  0.71
Number of observations: 145
Source: FDZ (1999), Federal Statistical Offi ce (VALUEADDED), and Agricultural Census 1979 (GINI79)
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unevenness of land distribution contributes to faster growth 
of some farms and accelerated exits of others and thereby 
to higher mobility and an accelerated dynamic in structural 
change. Higher mobility and faster growth are associated 
with entrepreneurial strategies by observers. These results 
support the notion that conservative strategies represent a 
rational reaction towards specifi c land market situations and 
environmental conditions.
An analogous interpretation applies to the interaction 
between RENTEDLAND and GINI79, as RENTEDLAND, 
like LESSFAVOURED, is associated with reduced rents of 
the status quo. The positive coeffi cient for VALUEAD-
DED shows that a higher potential to realise value added 
contributes positively to a dynamic development, i.e. an 
entrepreneurial impression upon observers. Nevertheless, 
this positive relationship is attenuated by a high share of 
rented land as the negative coeffi cient on the interaction 
between VALUEADDED and RENTEDLAND implies. 
A high share of rented land signals potential instability of 
farms and also a tightness of the local land market. Dairy 
farms (COWS) are characterised by high investments 
and sunk costs and therefore by high rents of status quo. 
Accordingly, they contribute signifi cantly to observed con-
servatism of producers.
Table 3: Explanation of conservatism, respectively entrepreneurial attitudes of farmers in NUTS 3 districts of western Germany in 2007.
Logistic proportional odds models Generalised linear model
Outcome: MODERN CONSERVATIVE ENTREPRENEUR
Number of classes: 3 4
Parameter Interaction with ... Directed at most conservative class Reversed
Intercept -1.19 ***(0.243)
-1.78 ***
(0.251)
-1.57 ***
(0.095)
Intercept 1.08 ***(0.239)
-0.15
(0.196)
Intercept 1.24 ***(0.225)
GINI79 0.17 ***(0.048)
0.09 *
(0.038)
-0.02
(0.020)
LESSFAVOURED 0.006(0.006)
0.004
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.003)
GINI79 -0.004 ***(0.001)
-0.002 *
(0.001)
0.001 ***
(0.001)
RENTEDLAND 0.04 °(0.024)
0.02
(0.021)
-0.01
(0.011)
GINI79 -0.01 **(0.004)
0.004 *
(0.002)
VALUEADDED -0.13 **(0.043)
-0.10 **
(0.034)
0.03 *
(0.015)
RENTEDLAND 0.01 **(0.004)
0.01 **
(0.004)
MEANSIZE -0.03 °(0.018)
COWS 0.05 ***(0.014)
0.04 ***
(0.012)
-0.02 *
(0.006)
(Pseudo) R-square 0.31 0.24 0.25
Likelihood-Ratio < .0001 < .0001
Score < .0001 < .0001
Wald < .0001 < .0001
R-square change due to interaction 1 0.07 ***
R-square change due to interaction 2 0.04 *
Number of observations 135 138 100
Note: Standard errors in parentheses below coeffi cients. ***, **, *, and ° denote signifi cance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level
Source: own calculation
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Figure 5: The differentiated effect of historical land distribution 
(Gini coeffi cient) on observed entrepreneurial behaviour amongst 
farmers in NUTS 3 districts of western Germany in 2007.
Source: own fi gure
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Relationship between strategies and 
the current land market situation
The previous section assessed the impact of the land 
market upon farmers’ observed behaviour. This section, in 
contrast, analyses the possible impact of farmers’ observed 
general strategic orientation upon the current land mar-
ket, possibly mitigated by attitudes, which might be col-
lateral consequences of the long term strategic orientation 
of local producers. The development of such attitudes in a 
quantity competition regime might support the sustainabil-
ity of regional differences in farm development strategies 
and therefore strengthen path dependence in farm structure 
development. This second causal direction completes the 
proposed refl exive relationship between strategies and land 
market. Interest now focuses on the relationship between 
farm structure, the economic environment and farmers’ 
observed behaviour on the one side and current dynamics in 
structural change and the situation on the land market on the 
other. The analysis relies on the factors described above. The 
 construction of the model to be estimated is guided by a sim-
ple logic of causation. Thereby BEHAVIOUR is assumed to 
impact upon farm structure DYNAMICS which infl uences 
the situation on the LANDMARKET (compare Table 1). The 
remaining three factors that describe farmers’ OPPORTU-
NITIES (NOPROFIT, INVESTOPTION and ADINCOME) 
and relevant indicators from secondary statistics (see Tables 
4 and 2) enter the model as covariates.
The model is formulated in a mediation approach, which 
allows testing direct impacts of variables upon each other 
as well as indirect effects, i.e. effects that are mediated by 
another additional variable. The idea of mediation is con-
ceptually a challenge while it is rather easy to implement 
technically. Mediation models simply consist of a series of 
regressions with a subsequent inclusion of mediation vari-
ables (Hayes, 2013)7. In order to identify the indirect effects 
of the exogenous variable on the endogenous variable via the 
m mediators, m+1 models are estimated in an overarching 
logical model with a hierarchical causal structure. The fi rst 
model explains the fi rst mediator in terms of the exogenous 
variable and the n covariates:
 (1)
The second model explains the second mediator in terms 
of the exogenous variable and the fi rst mediator:
 (2)
The third model explains the third mediator in terms of 
the exogenous variable and the fi rst and second mediator and 
so on:
7 In Margarian (2010a) the alternative approach of a structural equation model 
(SEM) was applied, which is more fl exible but also more demanding in terms of as-
sumptions. Owing to partly justifi ed concerns with respect to complex SEMs, in this 
paper we decided for a reduction in model complexity that in turn allows for the ap-
plication of the more robust mediation approach.
 (3)
The fi nal model explains the endogenous variable in 
terms of the exogenous variable and all mediators:
 (4)
In this last equation,  determines the direct effect of the 
exogenous variable (ENTREPRENEUR) upon the endog-
enous variable (LANDMARKET). The indirect effect of 
the exogenous upon the endogenous variable via selected 
mediators m is calculated by the multiplication of  with 
 with , i.e., by the multiplication 
• of the estimated effect of the exogenous variable 
upon the fi rst mediator in the causal chain
• with the estimated effect of mediator m upon media-
tor m+1 in the causal chain
• with the estimated effect of the last mediator in the 
causal chain upon the endogenous variable.
A summation of all direct and indirect effects gives the 
total effect. The total effect could also be estimated as:
 (5)
The total effect may be insignifi cant despite signifi cant 
direct and indirect effects if the signs of single effects are 
oppositional. This case applies in our model. The assessment 
of the signifi cance of indirect effects necessitates some fur-
ther calculations, which have been largely facilitated by the 
new Macro PROCESS that is available for SAS and SPSS 
(Hayes, 2013)8. This macro applies bootstrap confi dence 
intervals for inference about indirect effects as the frequently 
applied Sobel test is assumed to rely on unrealistic assump-
tions9. The calculated signifi cances that are presented in the 
following rely on these 95 per cent bias-corrected bootstrap 
confi dence intervals. The number of bootstrap samples was 
set to 10,000.
Our model asks whether the principal strategic orientation 
of a region’s farmers (ENTREPRENEUR) impacts upon other 
attitudes of a region’s farmers, specifi cally upon HABITUAL 
and upon ESTEEM. ENTREPRENEUR and HABITUAL are 
both supposed to impact upon ESTEEM. A mediation of the 
effect of ENTREPRENEUR on LANDMARKET by HABIT-
UAL and ESTEEM is theoretically expected, as non-price 
competition contributes to low values of ENTREPRENEUR 
and supplies the possibility for a larger variety of ‘surviving’ 
attitudes; but it does not necessarily imply strength of specifi c 
attitudes. At the same time, the passive behaviour indicated 
by HABITUAL reduces demand for land and relaxes the land 
market while high ESTEEM provides additional rents of the 
8 Similar tasks are provided by the ‘sgmediation’ command in STATA. Nevertheless, 
the most fl exible and easily accessible approach in technical terms is via a combination 
of the sureg command and the nlcom command in STATA.
9 For an assessment of different test of the signifi cance of mediated effects see 
MacKinnon et al. (2002).
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status quo and thereby rises the will to stabilise farms via 
necessary growth in land. Thereby, ENTREPRENEUR has 
additional indirect effects upon LANDMARKET that depend 
on its potential contribution to HABITUAL and ESTEEM.
The model further assesses how these observed behav-
ioural categories relate to the farm development dynamics, 
whose factors stem from a different construct (Table 1). STA-
BILITY simply describes the current stability of dynamic as 
well as stagnating farms. It also depends upon the poten-
tial delay of structural change in past years (RUPTURE). 
Whether variables from the behaviour construct impact upon 
farm development dynamics depends on exogenous condi-
tions that determine the extent of potential rents of the status 
quo and farmers’ outside opportunities. If an impact exists, 
an indirect relationship between BEHAVIOUR and LAND-
MARKET is expected, thereby justifying the hypothesis of a 
mediated relationship in this case.
Figure 6 indicates all of the possible relationships that 
were tested in the mediation model, with dotted lines indicat-
ing those relationships that connect variables which are not 
from the same construct. The results of the different regres-
sion models that form the basis of the mediation approach 
are presented in Table 4. The fi rst model explains HABIT-
UAL, which is closely negatively related to the exogenous 
variable ENTREPRENEUR as expected. The coeffi cients on 
Entrepreneur
Habituality
Esteem
Rupture
Stability
Landmarket
+
+
+
+
-
-
-
-
-
Indirect effect with 95% probability between -0.90 and -0.05
Entrepreneur Esteem Landmarket
Indirect effect with 95% probability between -0.57 and -0.03
Entrepreneur Habituality Esteem Landmarket
Indirect effect with 95% probability between -0.58 and -0.02
Entrepreneur Habituality Rupture Landmarket
Figure 6: Causal relationships between economic environment, 
structural situation, farmers’ attitude and strategic decisions in 
NUTS 3 districts of western Germany in 2007.
Note: Solid lines indicate relations between factors that relate to constructs and are 
therefore correlated by construction. Dotted lines indicate relations between techni-
cally unrelated variables.
Source: own fi gure
Table 4: Results of the separate regression models in the mediation approach.
Outcome: HABITUAL ESTEEM RUPTURE STABILITY LANDMARKET
Constant 4.175 ***(0.415)
0.164
(0.425)
3.405 ***
(0.648)
4.211 ***
(0.778)
4.599 **
(1.778)
Exogeneous variable
ENTREPRENEUR -0.815 ***(0.120)
-0.546 ***
(0.099)
0.146
(0.187)
0.043
(0.185)
0.042
(0.340)
Mediators
HABITUAL 0.380 ***(0.081)
0.486 **
(0.146)
0.025
(0.157)
-0.542 °
(0.288)
ESTEEM -0.293(0.203)
0.138
(0.203)
0.706 °
(0.375)
RUPTURE -0.236 °(0.132)
0.493 *
(0.250)
STABILITY -0.430 °(0.250)
Controls
Factors
NOPROFIT -0.019(0.068)
0.002
(0.042)
0.091
(0.064)
-0.074
(0.064)
-0.299 **
(0.119)
INVESTOPTION 0.273 **(0.109)
0.022
(0.070)
0.052
(0.107)
-0.045
(0.105)
0.297
(0.194)
ADINCOME 0.033(0.111)
-0.033
(0.068)
0.310 **
(0.104)
-0.177
(0.110)
-0.132
(0.206)
Variables from secondary statistics
GINI79 -0.037 *(0.018)
0.021 °
(0.011)
0.013
(0.018)
0.013
(0.017)
-0.016
(0.032)
LANDQUALITY 0.007(0.010)
0.003
(0.006)
0.017 °
(0.009)
0.024 **
(0.009)
-0.029
(0.018)
VALUEADDED -0.038 *(0.018)
0.031 **
(0.012)
-0.050 **
(0.019)
-0.014
(0.020)
0.028
(0.036)
MEANSIZE 0.006(0.009)
0.015 **
(0.005)
-0.019 *
(0.009)
0.004
(0.009)
-0.010
(0.017)
COWS -0.005(0.006)
0.003
(0.004)
-0.010 °
(0.006)
0.006
(0.006)
0.014
(0.011)
R-square 0.61 0.80 0.51 0.29 0.29
p-value of whole model 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.090
Note: N = 67. Standard errors in parentheses below coeffi cients. ***, **, * and ° denote signifi cance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Source: own calculation
Local land markets and farmers’ strategies in Germany
11
the covariates show that passive behaviour is stronger, where 
farmers seem to invest in non-farm assets (INVESTOP-
TION, see Table 1) and where the initial inequality in farm 
size distribution (GINI79) and the value added of agriculture 
(VALUEADDED) are rather low.
The second model explains the second mediator, 
ESTEEM. ESTEEM is positively related to HABITUAL 
and negatively to ENTREPRENEUR. Moreover, it is higher, 
where the value added of agriculture per hectare is higher and 
where the mean size of farms is larger. One could interpret 
this result as such: in regions with few alternatives, farmers 
are rather passive and stabilise their farms. If at the same 
time they are lucky enough to have relatively large farms 
and good conditions for intensive production, their esteem is 
high as compared to other professions. If, on the other hand, 
farmers are outside-oriented, i.e. they use local alternatives 
and develop their farms entrepreneurially, or if the economic 
potential of existing farms is low, farming does not have a 
lower or higher esteem than any other occupation. The third 
model explains the second mediating variable, RUPTURE. 
This situation of delayed structural change and a structural 
divide between small and large farms is positively related to 
a passive behaviour of farmers (HABITUAL) but not so to 
the other two factors of the behaviour construct. Quite plau-
sibly, delayed structural change is also more relevant where 
additional income sources exist (ADINCOME) and where 
VALUEADDED and the farms’ MEANSIZE are smaller. 
The current STABILITY of farms (fourth model) is, as 
expected, negatively related to a delayed structural change 
(RUPTURE). It is additionally positively related to a bet-
ter LANDQUALITY. Finally, the LANDMARKET (fi fth 
model) is more relaxed where the passive behaviour of farm-
ers dominates (HABITUAL) and where ESTEEM is low, 
probably because a lower esteem contributes to higher exit 
mobility. In regions that are characterised by a delayed struc-
tural change (RUPTURE) the land market is rather tight, 
while in contrast in regions with stable farms, the land mar-
ket is rather relaxed. According to the covariates, in regions 
where profi tability of farming is low (NOPROFIT), the land 
market is more relaxed as well.
Figure 6 summarises the signifi cant causal relationships 
between ENTREPRENEUR, the mediators and LAND-
MARKET from the estimation results in Table 4. Pluses 
indicate signifi cant positive coeffi cients, minuses signifi cant 
negative coeffi cients.
The causal chains below the graphic present the sig-
nifi cant indirect effects of ENTREPRENEUR upon LAND-
MARKET according to the bootstrapping approach. While 
the direct effect of ENTREPRENEUR is insignifi cantly posi-
tive, all signifi cant indirect effects are negative. This denoted 
difference between the direct and the indirect effect hints at 
the ambiguity inherent in the relationship between ENTRE-
PRENEUR and LANDMARKET. On the one hand, more 
entrepreneurial or growth oriented farmers demand more 
land. On the other hand, they might also be characterised by 
a higher mobility or rather crowd smaller farms out of pro-
duction (Margarian, 2010a, b). The results of the mediation 
model tell us that in regions where an entrepreneurial strate-
gic orientation is accompanied by low HABITUALITY and/
or low ESTEEM, the negative impact prevails: contrary to 
fi rst intuition, the dominant growth orientation contributes to 
a more relaxed land market. This implies that a more con-
servative strategic orientation goes along with a tighter land 
market if it is accompanied by high HABITUALITY and/or 
high ESTEEM. The partial relevance of RUPTURE indicates 
that this result is also due to the fact that structural change 
is less delayed in regions with more ‘entrepreneurial’ farms.
Discussion
The results of the two types of empirical models presented 
in the paper are in accordance with the idea of a refl exive 
relationship between the land market and farmers’ strategies. 
According to the fi rst model that explains observed behav-
iour by indicators of local agricultural structure, farmers act 
more conservatively in the observers’ eyes in land markets 
with reduced competition. As the results show, this might be 
due for example to the dominance of few large farms on the 
land market or to a high share of rented land, which limits 
the ability to realise new rents of the status quo by additional 
growth. In this perspective and according to the fi rst model, 
farmers minimise risks by continual but restricted growth in 
order to secure sustainable realisation of rents of the status 
quo. This general ‘attitude’ (or growth orientation) of farm-
ers can therefore be explained endogenously.
The results of the second model based on mediated 
regression tell us that in regions where an entrepreneurial 
strategic orientation is accompanied by low HABITUALITY 
and/or low ESTEEM, the negative impact prevails: contrary 
to fi rst intuition, the dominant growth orientation contributes 
to a more relaxed land market. This implies that a more con-
servative strategic orientation goes along with a tighter land 
market if it is accompanied by high HABITUALITY and/or 
high ESTEEM. The partial relevance of RUPTURE indicates 
that this result is also due to the fact that structural change 
is less delayed in regions with more ‘entrepreneurial’ farms. 
Accordingly, not only is observed behaviour explained by 
the local farm structure (model one) but farmers’ strategic 
orientation also affects the current land market situation.
This refl exivity implies that the specifi c conditions in local 
land markets have the potential to contribute to a regional 
differentiation of farm development strategies. If strategies 
are thereby recognised as endogenous to the process of struc-
tural development, the possibilities of path dependence and 
of different equilibria need to be taken into account as well. 
The situation is even more complicated by the recognition 
that (weaker) competition on quantities implies a less severe 
selection process and thereby allows for a larger variety 
in fundamental attitudes towards development among the 
remaining farms. These attitudes might be conditional upon 
other factors such as local culture or local opportunities. 
They potentially further contribute to the variety in observed 
farm development strategies, thereby necessitating a careful 
analysis of local conditions in the explanation of land mar-
kets and of structural change in agriculture10. The results also 
imply that the observed differences in land markets and in 
10 Taking into account the possibility of different equilibria leads to more differenti-
ated models and the need to estimate far more coeffi cients in the explanation of struc-
tural change as can be seen from Margarian, 2010c.
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structural change are a refl ection of rational considerations 
under given circumstances and not, as sometimes assumed, 
a refl ection of irrational behaviour. The results thereby, on 
the one hand, potentially increase the diffi culty of analyses 
of agricultural economists but, on the other, raise hope that 
the observed phenomena are principally open to economic 
explanations.
Finally, in a methodological respect a word of caution 
seems appropriate: usually it is not possible to empirically 
determine the direction of causal relationships. Therefore, 
the value of the presented approach is in the combination 
of a proposed endogenous explanation for the observed het-
erogeneity in strategies and dynamics and the supplemen-
tary statistical analysis of primary data from a survey that 
was designed in order to test the derived hypotheses. If the 
theoretical fundament is principally contested, the empirical 
analysis will not be able to prove the refl exive relationship 
between market and strategies; but if the theoretical argu-
ment is not refused in principle, the empirical results may 
serve as enhancing evidence (Pearl, 2008).
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